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I. ISSUES 
The Court is asked to consider several questions under the free review standard. I These 
questions come in three main categories. 
The first category of issues is mootness. This Court must decide whether this case is 
moot, and if so, whether this case fits in any exceptions to the mootness doctrine. 
The second category is whether, in what ways, and to what extent the District Court erred 
as a matter of law. This Court must determine whether the District Court correctly interpreted 
and applied Idaho Code (hereinafter "I.C.") § 9-335 when it determined that investigatory 
records in the prosecutor's possession, pending a charging decision, should be disclosed. See 
Gibson v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 787, 789 (2003). This Court must determine whether law 
enforcement agencies, in possession of investigatory records under prosecutorial review, must 
have absolute certainty that disclosure of those records would "interfere with enforcement 
proceedings" or "deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication" to justify 
exemption of such records from disclosure? This Court must decide whether the District Court 
correctly recognized the objective standard of review that must be made prior to disclosure under 
I.C. § 9-338, as well as whether the District Court correctly interpreted I.C. § 9-344 when it 
applied a subjective standard of review to Mr. Wade's petition. 
I Despite Mr. Wade's failure to address the applicable standard of review to decisions on issues of fact by the lower 
court, the County recognizes a clear error standard applies to issues offact decided by the District Court. When 
reviewing a discretionary decision, this Court determines "( 1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as 
one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with 
any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 567, 199 P.3d 123, 142 (2008). 
In the Gibson case, the Court suggested that an insufficient record hampered their ability to properly review the 
lower Court's decision. In an abundance of caution, Appellant submitted the documents to be reviewed by the Court 
in camera. 
2 The County has been using the terms "prosecutorial review" and "investigation" by the prosecutor 
interchangeably. For purposes of clarity in this Reply Brief, the County will refer to the screening, deliberating, 
conducting additional investigation, and making of charging decisions for cases as "prosecutorial review." 
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The final category pertains to attorney fees in the context of public records litigation. 
Included in this section are the questions of what attorney fee statute applies and whether the 
County frivolously pursued this appeal. 
II. ST ANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review in a public records case is free review for questions of law. 
Gibson, 138 Idaho at 789. Mr. Wade, the Respondent, agrees with this standard in his Reply 
Brief: 
As the issue is jurisdictional, the Court exercises free review in making its 
decision as to whether an issue is moot. .. See Arambarri v. Armstrong 152 Idaho 
734, 738, 274 P.3d 1249, 1253 (Idaho, 2012). 
(Resp. Brief., p. 6). 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise free 
review. Magic Valley Newsps., Inc., 138 Idaho at 144, 59, P.3d at 315 (citing 
Lopez v. State, Indus. Spec, Indem. Fund, 136 Idaho 174,30 P.3d 952 (2001)). 
(Resp. Brief., p. 13). 
The standard of review in a case of statutory interpretation has been well settled: 
This Court exercises free review over question of law, including the interpretation 
of a statute. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of Agric., 143 
Idaho 366, 368, 146 P.3d 632,634 (2006). 
(Resp. Brief., p. 16). As such, this Court may exercise free review over the District Court's 




The first issue the Court must decide is whether this case is moot, and if so, whether this 
case fits in any exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Not only is this case not moot, but this case 
fits in three, possibly even four, exceptions to the mootness doctrine. 
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF 
WADE V. CANYON COUNTY 
DOCKET NO. 40142-2012 
Page 2 of25 
1. This Case Is Not Moot Because the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's 
Office Did Not Provide Mr. Wade With the Requested Documents. 
A case is moot when the Court's ruling in the case will not have any impact or settle any 
current issue or problem. The Court recently declared that an issue is moot when "it does not 
present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded through judicial 
decree of specific relief." Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 848 (2012), citing 
AmerUel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849 (2005). The Court has 
provided various metrics with which to determine mootness, such as when "the issues presented 
are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome," Bradshaw v. 
State, 120 Idaho 429, 432 (1991), or when the issue "presents no justiciable controversy and a 
judicial determination will have no practical effect upon the outcome." Idaho County Property 
Owners Ass'n., Inc. v. Syringa Gen. Hosp. Dist., 119 Idaho 309, 315 (1991); Idaho Sch. for 
Equal Educ. Opportunity By & Through Eikum v. Idaho State Bd of Educ. By & Through 
Mossman, 128 Idaho 276, 281 (1996). 
The imprecise language of Mr. Wade's brief leads to the erroneous conclusion that the 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office (hereinafter "the County") produced the 
documents requested by Mr. Wade. Specifically, Mr. Wade's brief states the following: 
The only cognizable legal interest that the County had in the present appeal is the 
non-disclosure of the investigatory records that they claimed were exempt. Once 
those documents were voluntarily released through discovery and by order of the 
Federal District Court through a subpoena, the County had no other cognizable 
legal interest. 
(Resp. Brief, pp. 8-9). (Emphasis added). What Mr. Wade's brief fails to clarify is that the 
Federal District Court specifically did not order the County to tum over the investigatory 
records: 
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These three binders comprised the documents sought by the public records 
request, and constituted documents responsive to the requests for the Idaho State 
Police, Payette, and Fruitland investigative files. . . If this Court ordered 
compliance with the Rule 45 subpoena with respect to the three binders, it would 
nullify Judge Ryan's order and allow Wade to circumvent the stay ... Based upon 
the Court's analysis above, the Court will grant Canyon County's motion to quash 
the subpoena corresponding to items one, two, and three of the subpoena. 
Wade v. City afFruitland, 1:12-CV-00465-CWD, 2013 WL 149484, at *4-*6 (D. Idaho Jan. 14, 
2013). The Federal District Court recognized the importance of denying Mr. Wade's request for 
the investigatory records. Mr. Wade's argument is therefore misplaced to the extent that it 
suggests the Federal District Court's order moots the issues before this Court. Quite to the 
contrary, the Federal District Court carefully distinguished documents covered by Mr. Wade's 
public records request and those subject to disclosure by subpoena. ("The public records request 
did not ask for Canyon County's investigative file, but the Rule 45 subpoena did." Id. at 11.) 
The County has never provided Mr. Wade with the investigatory records for this case, 
and thus the controversy remains between the two parties.3 The fact that the City of Fruitland, or 
its counsel, produced documents helpful to Mr. Wade's case does not resolve the issue before 
this Court. Mr. Wade requested documents and the County, relying on I.C. § 9-335, denied his 
request. The District Court ordered the County to produce documents requested by Mr. Wade, 
and the County then appealed that order. The District Court stayed the order pending appeal; 
that order remains outstanding. 
2. Even if This Case Were Moot, All Three Mootness Exceptions Still Apply. 
Under Idaho law, an issue that might otherwise seem moot may be litigated on appeal if 
the issue fits within an exception to the mootness doctrine. The Idaho Supreme Court has carved 
out three exceptions to the mootness doctrine: 
3 The County does note that on January 18,2013, the criminal unit of the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's 
Office declined prosecution based on these investigatory records. 
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(1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the 
person raising the issue; 
(2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus is 
capable of repetition; and 
(3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of substantial public interest. 
Ameritel Inns, 141 Idaho at 851-52. 
The Court has also suggested a possible fourth exception for cases in which attorney fees 
remain an outstanding issue. In Henry v. Taylor, although the issue between the parties had been 
resolved, the Court reasoned as follows: 
However, it is not moot because Mr. Henry requests an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code sections 9-344(2), 12-117, and/or 12-121. Since the 
requested documents were provided after this lawsuit was instituted to compel 
their production, the issue of attorney fees remains an issue to be resolved." 
152 Idaho 155, 161 (2012). 
a. Deeming This Appeal as Moot Would Strip Investigatory Records in 
the Third Judicial District of Statutory Protection From Disclosure, 
and Thus Have Collateral Legal Consequences. 
Idaho courts have applied the first exception the possibility of collateral legal 
consequences - primarily in criminal cases. A criminal case will be found moot only if no 
collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction. Adams 
v. Killeen, 115 Idaho 1034, 1035 (Ct. App. 1989), citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); 
Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469 (1971). Collateral legal consequences are easy to spot in criminal 
proceedings. For example, if a defendant has already been released from prison, then appeals 
regarding an excessive sentence are moot. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227 (2004); citing 
State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662 (Ct.App. 2000). Appeals about violations of county jail hearing 
guidelines also do not fit the collateral legal consequences exception when the jail hearing itself 
did not result in the legal consequences, such as a revocation of probation. Adams, 115 Idaho at 
1034-35. On the other hand, appeals regarding criminal convictions themselves, even after 
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release from custody, may have sufficient collateral consequences to overcome mootness. 
Rogers, 140 Idaho at 227. Although Idaho case law on this mootness exception in civil 
proceedings is sparse, the principles remain the same. 
In this case, the County faces collateral legal consequences if this Court does not address 
the District Court's decision. The District Court's opinion strips investigatory records of their 
statutory exemption granted by I.C. § 9-335. If not corrected or clarified, this opinion will 
inform future decisions in the Third Judicial District regarding public records requests for 
investigatory records. 
b. Litigation Regarding Public Records Requests for Investigatory 
Records of Pending Cases Are Likely To Evade Judicial Review. 
The second exception - likelihood of evading judicial review - applies when the 
challenged conduct occurs on a typically short, predictable, cyclical time frame. One example of 
conduct on such a cyclical time frame would be the promulgation of standards by the Idaho State 
Board of Education. See Idaho Schools, 128 Idaho at 283. In the Idaho Schools case, in 1990, 
an education association filed a declaratory judgment action against the Idaho State Board of 
Education and the Idaho Legislature (hereinafter collectively as "the State) for deficient school 
funding. Id. at 279. In 1994, the State filed a motion for declaration of mootness based upon 
subsequent action by the Legislature and the State Board of Education. Id. at 280-281. 
Regardless of the legislative changes, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that the case fit into 
the "likelihood of evading judicial review" exception to the mootness doctrine. Id. at 283. The 
Court reasoned that the State Board could otherwise promulgate new standards every year, 
sunset the previous year's standards, and thus evade review. Id. at 283. See also Am. Lung 
Ass'n of Idaho/Nevada v. State, Dept. of Agric., 142 Idaho 544, 546 (2006) (likelihood of 
evading judicial review exception applied when petitioner appealed a 2004 determination by the 
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Director of the Department of Agriculture, even though the Director later issued a 2005 
determination); Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 524 (2006) (likelihood of evading judicial review 
exception applied to visitation right issues, even though visitation rights in question were no 
longer at issue because child's father returned from Iraq, because father was still a member of 
National Guard, and thus those visitation rights could again become an issue). 
When the challenged conduct is not typically short, predictable, or cyclical in nature, the 
Court is reluctant to grant the "likelihood of evasion" exception to the mootness doctrine. In 
Koch v. Canyon County, taxpayers challenged, under the state constitution, a lease agreement 
that Canyon County had entered into. 145 Idaho 158, 160 (2008). By the time the Idaho 
Supreme Court ruled on the case, the county commissioners had already purchased and resold 
the property. Id. In denying an exception to the mootness doctrine, the Court reasoned that the 
challenged conduct was unlikely to evade judicial review in the future because taxpayers now 
had standing to challenge this conduct. Id. at 163. In contrast to standards that can be and are 
regularly modified within a relatively short time frame, government agencies do not buy and 
subsequently sell property as a typical matter, and thus taxpayers can expect to be able to 
challenge future purchases of property without the issue becoming moot. Similarly in Freeman 
v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, the Court determined that the "likelihood of evasion" exception did 
not apply. In Freeman, a prisoner threatened to sue a prison guard and was subsequently 
disciplined for the threat. 138 Idaho 872, 874 (Ct.App. 2003). After an unsuccessful 
administrative appeal, the prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition alleging free speech violations. 
Id. at 874-75. His petition was dismissed. Id. By the time the Court of Appeals ruled in this 
case, the prisoner was already released from prison. Id. at 876. The Court noted that cases of 
this kind do not necessarily evade review because the Ninth Circuit had just recently ruled on an 
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Idaho prisoner's First Amendment challenge in Hargis v. Foster, 312 F.3d 404 (9th Cir. 2002). 
Id. 
This public records case with Mr. Wade fits squarely within this second exception to the 
mootness doctrine. The very nature of criminal investigations renders them short, predictable, 
and cyclical. As a matter of course, police officers gather evidence, prosecutors review the case, 
and then either file criminal charges or decline prosecution. If charges are filed, the case goes 
through the court system until the case is adjudicated. Because of an investigation's short-lived 
lifespan, public records litigation over the investigatory records of a pending investigation will 
inevitably become moot by appellate court review. In that way, this case more closely resembles 
the Idaho Schools, American Lung, and Webb cases than the Koch or Freeman cases. Similar to 
Idaho Schools and American Lung, in which standards or determinations were renewed, thus 
rendering previous versions moot, investigations predictably run their course and then are closed, 
only to be replaced by new investigations. The fact that the County made a charging decision or 
that Mr. Wade obtained the documents from other parties through civil discovery demonstrates 
how eventually, once a charging decision is made or a civil lawsuit is filed, the investigatory 
records often become available for disclosure. 
c. The Confidentiality of Investigatory Records Under Prosecutorial 
Review Is of Substantial Public Interest and Is a Matter of First 
Impression. 
The third exception allows the Court to address an otherwise moot issue if it is one of 
substantial public interest to provide for future direction and guidance. Idaho Schools, 128 Idaho 
at 284, citing Johnson v. Bonner County Sch. Dist. No. 82, 126 Idaho 490,492 (1994). In Idaho 
Schools, the Court determined that even though the regulations at issue had sunsetted, the 
constitutional issues regarding state funding levels were important enough to fit under this third 
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exception. 128 Idaho at 284. Similarly, in Johnson, the issue was whether a trial court had the 
power to grant injunctive relief to prevent a biased decision-maker from conducting a due 
process hearing. 126 Idaho at 490. Although the hearing had already been held by the time the 
Court ruled on the issue, the Court nevertheless determined that this issue had substantial public 
interest and thus granted review. Id. at 490-491. The fact that the hearing had already occurred 
did not prevent the Court from taking on the issue because of the importance of local school 
boards. Id. at 493. 
The Court has narrowly construed the "substantial public interest" exception. This 
exception typically does not apply if the Court has already decided the issue in a previous case. 
See Miller v. Bd. of Trustees, 132 Idaho 244, 246 (1998); Johnson, 126 Idaho at 490-491; School 
Dist. No. 351 Oneida County v. Oneida Ed. Ass'n, 98 Idaho 486,488 (1977). In Miller, the 
Court declined to apply the "substantial public interest" exception because the Johnson Court 
had previously ruled on the issue. Id. In Johnson, the Court stated that it chose to review the 
otherwise moot case "because the question is one of first impression in this Court and because of 
substantial public interest in the question." Id. at 490. The third exception also may not apply if 
the Court believes that the issue will not evade judicial review. See Freeman, 138 Idaho at 877. 
In the Freeman case, the Court determined that although the alleged constitutional violations 
could be of substantial public interest, "the number of such claims that reach the courts render it 
unlikely that recurrences of denied meaningful court access will escape judicial review." Id. 
The public records issues in this case are of substantial public interest and are matters of 
first impression,4 and thus fit the third mootness exception. A question at the crux of this case is 
whether an investigatory record is deemed to be "inactive" during prosecutorial review. The 
4 Refer to the diagram in the County's brief indicating the lack ofIdaho case law on point for this question. 
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District Court's initial decision indicated that prosecutorial review did not keep an investigation 
"active." Another question in this case is whether I.C. § 9-335(1 )(a) through (f) requires 
factually certain interference "with enforcement proceedings" (hereinafter "interfere" or 
"interference") or deprivation "of a right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication" (hereinafter 
"deprive" or "deprivation") to justify exemption of investigatory records from disclosure. 
Furthermore, this case also raises the question of whether the County was correct in applying an 
objective standard - without looking to the specifics of the case or Mr. Wade - in denying the 
public records request. This Court has never directly addressed any of these questions, so these 
issues are of first impression in Idaho. Furthermore, answers to these questions have severe 
consequences across this state for law enforcement agencies (which includes prosecutors) 
handling public records requests for investigatory records that await a charging decision or 
adjudication in the courts. See Amicus Brief, pp. 16-19. A ruling that investigatory records 
pending a charging decision are subject to disclosure would open the floodgates for public 
records requests by individuals that suspect that law enforcement is investigating their potentially 
illegal conduct. Depending on the contents of these investigatory records, these individuals 
could modify their behavior and conduct, and even flee the jurisdiction. 
B. MISTAKE OF LAW 
The second category of issues that this Court faces is whether the District Court erred as a 
matter of law when it determined that investigatory records pending prosecutorial review should 
be disclosed to Mr. Wade. The County contends that the District Court is in error as a matter of 
law because (1) prosecutorial review does not render an investigation "inactive;" (2) even 
inactive investigatory records can be exempt from disclosure; (3) the law does not require 
factually certain interference in each specific case to justify withholding investigatory records; 
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and (4) the PRA requires objective treatment of requestors, without looking to the reasons for the 
records requests. 
1. Prosecutorial Review Does Not Render an Investigation Inactive. 
It is well settled that prosecutors are "law enforcement" for purposes of the PRA. 
The relevant statute states as follows: 
As used herein, the term "law enforcement agency" means the office of the 
attorney general, the office of the state controller, the Idaho state police, the office 
of any prosecuting attorney, sheriff or municipal police department. 
I.C. § 9-335; see also Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 796 (2002). (Recognizing that 
prosecutors are law enforcement under the PRA.) Furthermore, the proposition that the work of 
the prosecutor is to enforce the law, and therefore its work is subsumed in the definition of law 
enforcement, has long been established. In I.C. § 31-2227, the statutes state as follows: 
Irrespective of police powers vested by statute in state, county, and municipal 
officers, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the state ofldaho that the primary 
duty of enforcing all the penal provisions of any and all statutes of this state, in 
any court, is vested in the sheriff and prosecuting attorney of each of the several 
counties. When in the judgment of such county officers, they need assistance from 
municipal peace officers within the county, they are authorized and directed to 
call for such and such local officers shall render such assistance .... 
See also Newman v. Lance, 129 Idaho 98, 103 (1996). (Court stating that "The legislature has 
made it the primary obligation of the prosecutor to enforce the state penal laws." [Emphasis 
added.]) 
The fact that investigatory records are under prosecutorial review for a charging decision 
does not render an investigation "inactive."s As argued in the County's previous brief, no Idaho 
statute or case law "has defined 'active' or 'inactive' investigation." As far as a prosecutor is 
5 The County would point out that prosecutorial review could entail follow-up investigation, and thus arguably could 
even be an investigation itself. If follow-up "investigation" by the prosecutor removes the "inactive" status from an 
investigation, then cases under prosecutorial review are not necessarily "inactive." Furthermore, prosecutorial 
review could also constitute an "enforcement proceeding," as contemplated by I.C. § 9-335(l)(a), that premature 
disclosure would interfere with. 
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concerned, as long as the prosecutor is trying to make a charging decision, the case is still 
"active." Furthermore, when a prosecutor reviews a case, the prosecutor can decline 
prosecution, file criminal charges, or request further investigation. A determination that 
prosecutorial review renders a case "inactive" therefore is not rooted in any Idaho law, and does 
not contemplate the possibility that further investigation, by request of the prosecutor, may still 
occur. 
Prosecutorial review6 should not be short-circuited by the early disclosure of 
investigatory records. The County argues that this is exactly the sort of interference that the 
Legislature sought to avoid in adopting I.C. § 9-335, and that this Court clarified in the line of 
cases interpreting the PRA, culminating in Bolger and Gibson. As a prosecuting agency, the 
County suggests to the Court that any investigatory record under prosecutorial review be deemed 
"active" or at least protected from disclosure under I.e. § 9-335. 
While the District Court later backed away from its initial decision that the investigation 
was inactive (R. p. 100), the District Court's misunderstanding of the statute and the role of the 
prosecutor remained in each revision of its order. The District Court failed to recognize that 
prosecutorial review of law enforcement records, prior to charging or declining a case, does not 
necessarily render an investigation "inactive." The District Court's initial opinion stated the 
following: 
It appears from the Court's review of the documents that the last active 
investigation into this incident was on January 19, 2012 when Idaho State Police 
Detective Ken White interviewed the manager of the Reel Theater and collected a 
CD entitled "Video from Reel Theatre." 
6 Another way the Court could rule is to include "prosecutorial review" as a type of investigation. 
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(R. p. 52).7 The District Court thus effectively ignored the affidavits of the County's Chief 
Criminal Deputy, the County's Investigator, and the Chief Deputy of the Canyon County 
Sheriffs office. Investigator Bill Crawford provided an affidavit to the Court dated June 6, 
2012, indicating that he had been tasked on Mach 15, 2012 "to review the officer involved 
shooting for criminal charges ... " (R. p. 60). Chief Gary Deulen provided an affidavit to the 
court stating, in relevant part, that the Chief Criminal Deputy contacted him "to review an officer 
involved shooting for criminal charges on or about April 1, 2012." (R. p. 59). Finally, Chief 
Criminal Deputy Chris Topmiller provided the Court with an affidavit explaining that he had 
been tasked with a review of the officer involved shooting on or about February 14,2012. (R. p. 
57). Investigator Crawford, Chief Deulen and Prosecutor Topmiller were all actively 
participating in "prosecutorial review." The District Court pointed to no law supporting its 
initial determination that the investigation, then under prosecutorial review, was inactive. 
2. Inactive Investigatory Records Pending Prosecutorial Review Are Still 
Exempt From Disclosure. 
In certain circumstances, inactive investigatory records are still exempt from disclosure. 
Under I.C. § 9-335(3), public agencies must disclose an inactive investigatory record "unless the 
disclosure would violate the provisions of subsection (l)(a) through (f) of this section." The 
concerns listed in I.C. § 9-335(l)(a) through (f) therefore still become applicable when 
determining whether disclosure is appropriate for inactive investigations. As long as disclosure 
of those investigatory records would result in any of the I.C. § 9-335(1)(a) through (f) concerns, 
then the prosecutor must not disclose the investigatory records. This Court has, in fact, already 
found an instance in which investigatory records of a case, in which the charging decision had 
7 This observation by the District Court also fails to recognize that a prosecuting attorney's work in screening and 
reviewing a case could potentially be part of an "investigation" as contemplated by the PRA. 
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been made, were still exempt from disclosure. Gibson, 138 Idaho at 790-791 (investigatory 
records were exempt from disclosure, even after conflict counsel reviewed the records and 
determined that criminal charges were not appropriate); see also Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-21 for 
further discussion regarding Gibson. 
Even if the investigation were inactive at the time of the District Court's decision,s the 
investigatory records regarding Mr. Wade were still exempt from disclosure under I.C. § 9-
335(3). The County had yet to make a charging decision, and therefore denied Mr. Wade's 
records request. Strictly applying the Gibson result to this case would allow for these 
investigatory records to be exempt from disclosure even after the County declined to file 
criminal charges in this case. For the County to therefore refuse to disclose the records until 
after making its charging decisions falls well within the exemption from disclosure granted by 
the Gibson Court. 
3. Idaho Courts Do Not Require Absolutely Certain Interference or 
Deprivation To Withhold Investigatory Records. 
The PRA does not require absolute certainty that disclosure of investigatory records 
would result in adverse effects. Along with four other scenarios, the statute at I.C. § 9-335 
exempts investigatory records from disclosure if production of such records would interfere and 
deprive. The statutory language alone seems to require certain interference or certain deprivation 
to justify refusals of requests for investigatory records. Requiring such a literal adherence 
would, however, prevent law enforcement agencies from maintaining confidentiality of most, if 
not all, of its investigatory records, even those for pending cases. 
In any investigation, law enforcement can never precisely gauge the likelihood that a 
requestor of public records will use information to interfere or deprive. To require an absolutely 
8 This is not a concession, but merely for the sake of argument. 
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certain factual determination of interference or deprivation to justify each denial of a public 
records request would be impossible, and thus lead to an absurd result. This Court stated that 
"[t]he court, in construing a statute, should aim to give it a sensible construction, such as will 
effectuate the legislative intent, and, if possible, avoid an absurd conclusion." Safe Air For 
Everyone v. Idaho State Dept. of Agric., 145 Idaho 164, 166 (2008). Therefore, the District 
Court's reading of the statute I.C. § 9-335(1), which required absolute certainty of interference or 
deprivation, is not the most sensible construction or the most accurate reflection of the legislative 
intent, and cannot be the proper meaning. 
Idaho courts have not clarified whether a factual determination of absolutely certain 
interference or deprivation is required to deny a public records request for investigatory records. 
In Gibson v. Ada County, a district court reviewed the investigatory records of a case after the 
determination that no criminal charges were to be filed. 138 Idaho at 789. Because of that 
determination, the charging decision was made, and the case was closed. Despite the status of 
the case, the district court affirmed Ada County's refusal to disclose the investigatory records. 
The district court's opinion did not elaborate on the factors leading to its decision, but merely 
noted that it had conducted an in camera review, and was convinced that the documents were 
exempt from disclosure under I.C. § 9-335 and § 9-340B. Gibson v. Ada County, CV OC2594 
(Jan 30, 2001, District Court Judge Thomas Neville). On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court did 
not have the relevant documents before it, and affirmed the District Court's decision, finding that 
the decision was not clearly erroneous. 138 Idaho at 790. 
Though concise in its analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court hints that certain interference or 
deprivation is not required. In Bolger v. Lance, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the Attorney 
General's investigatory records and determined that the documents would "clearly 'interfere with 
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law enforcement proceedings' or 'disclose investigative techniques and procedures.'" 137 Idaho 
at 796. The Court, therefore, did not provide any guidance regarding the degree of certainty that 
law enforcement agencies must have regarding the I.C. § 9-335(1)(a) through (f) concerns. If 
anything, the Bolger Court suggested that a factual determination of certain interference was not 
required. In relevant part, the Court stated as follows: 
Additionally, our review of the documents and the record reveals that disclosure 
of the documents would clearly "interfere with law enforcement proceedings" or 
"disclose investigative techniques and procedures." I.C. § 9-335. 
137 Idaho at 796. (Emphasis added). By using the word "or" between the two reasons for 
exemption from disclosure, the Bolger Court suggested that neither result was factually 
absolutely certain to happen. If certainty of those results was critical to justify a disclosure 
decision, presumably, the Court would have so stated. Furthermore, if the Court's review of the 
documents showed a factual certainty of both of those results, then the Court would have used 
the word "and" in between the two reasons. Instead, the Court indicated that either result could 
plausibly occur, and therefore affirmed the Attorney General's decision to withhold the records. 
Id. 
As laid out in the County's previous brief, the legislative history of the Idaho PRA shows 
a clear overarching intent to shield law enforcement investigatory records from disclosure. The 
Legislature's statement of purpose set forth exceptions to the general exemption from disclosure 
granted for investigatory records. R.S. 12005 C3, 1986 House Statements of Purpose. 
Specifically, the Legislature wished that such records would be available to involved parties, 
their authorized representatives, and their insurers, but only to the extent that such disclosure 
would not endanger witnesses, prevent successful completion of criminal investigations, and 
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damage personal reputations. Jd. The stated general policy in favor of exempting investigatory 
records from disclosure noted nothing regarding the certainty of these adverse effects. 
In analyzing identical language contained in a previous version of the federal Freedom of 
Information Act, the United States Supreme Court condoned generalized denials of public 
records requests for investigatory records during the pendency of cases. N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire 
& Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,214-15 (1978).9 The Robbins Court determined that the National 
Labor Relations Board did not have to disclose witness statements prior to its hearing. Jd. at 236. 
In considering the statutory language "would interfere with enforcement proceedings," the 
Robbins Court articulated that this exemption was not to be applied and determined "on an 
individual, case-by-case basis." Jd. at 214. The Robbins Court determined that "Congress did not 
intend to prevent federal courts from determining that, with respect to particular kinds of 
enforcement proceedings, disclosure of particular kinds of investigatory records while a case is 
pending would generally 'interfere with enforcement proceedings.'" Jd. at 214-15. 
Public policy concerns of consistency lean strongly in favor of not requiring factual 
determinations regarding the certainty of interference or deprivation. If law enforcement 
agencies could exempt from disclosure only the investigatory records that are certain to cause 
one of the I.e. § 9-335(1)(a) through (f) problems, then law enforcement would not be able to 
exempt most, if any, of its records. To make such factual determinations, law enforcement 
agencies would have to scrutinize the known information about the requestor as well as the 
details of the case, and then make request-by-request determinations on whether to disclose the 
record or not. For purposes of public records, however, law enforcement agencies are expressly 
forbidden to conduct such scrutiny - the PRA specifically prohibits this analysis. See I.e. § 9-
9 As discussed in the County's brief, the Idaho PRA adopted the language of the federal Freedom ofInforrnation Act 
in 1986, after the Robbins decision. 
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338. The policy and spirit behind the PRA require an objective standard that exempts from 
disclosure the investigatory records of pending cases, and is consistent across requestors. 
In this case, the District Court misunderstood the standard the County was required to 
apply before denying Mr. Wade's request for documents under the PRA. The District Court 
stated in its second Memorandum and Decision: 
It is this Court's opinion that the statute clearly sets forth a requirement that 
disclosure of the relevant documents, to be exempt, must interfere with 
enforcement proceedings and/or deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an 
impartial adjudication. 
(R. p. 101). (Emphasis added). As evident in its decision, the District Court required the County 
to prove, with absolute certainty, that disclosure of the investigatory records in Mr. Wade's case 
specifically would interfere and deprive. The District Court therefore used reasoning that the 
United States Supreme Court in the Robbins decision flatly rejected. 
The County does not have to prove specifically how disclosure of investigatory records in 
Mr. Wade's case would, without fail, interfere and deprive. As explained above, such a 
construction of the PRA would lead to absurd results. The Idaho Supreme Court has never 
clarified that issue. The Robbins decision, and, to a lesser extent, the Bolger decision, both show 
that absolute certainty of interference is not necessary. Based on its experience, the County 
knew that such premature disclosure of investigatory records in criminal cases, in general, would 
lead to I.C. § 9-335(1)(a) through (f) concerns. Therefore, the District Court's focus on the fact 
that the County did not fully articulate all individualized concerns regarding disclosure of 
records in Mr. Wade's specific case was misplaced. The County properly relied on an objective 
standard that it could apply neutrally and consistently across all public records requestors, and 
properly denied Mr. Wade's request accordingly. 
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4. The Public Records Act Requires Objective - Not Subjective - Treatment of 
All Requests, and Does Not Allow For Different Treatment of Requestors 
Based on the Reasons For the Requests. 
The PRA requires treating all requestors equally. The definition of "public record" listed 
in I.C. § 9-337(13) is not contingent on the identity of the requestor or the validity of the 
requestor's reasons for wanting the record. As a general rule, records that are "public" for one 
requestor are therefore statutorily "public" for another. To ensure that the public had equal 
access to public records, the Legislature included I.C. § 9-335(5), which states as follows: 
The custodian shall make no inquiry of any person who requests a public record, 
except: 
(a) To verify the identity of the requester in accordance with section 9-342, Idaho 
Code; or 
(b) To ensure that the requested record or information will not be used for 
purposes of a mailing or telephone list prohibited by section 9-348, Idaho Code, 
or as otherwise provided by law; or 
(c) As required for purposes of protecting personal information from disclosure 
under chapter 2, title 49, Idaho Code, and federal law. 
I.e. § 9-335(5). The custodian cannot ask the requestor why the requestor wants the information 
- the custodian can only ensure that the information will not be used for mailing or telephone 
lists. I.C. § 9-338(5). Public agencies cannot grant records to some but not to others. Public 
agencies cannot change the "public" status of a record because of the validity of the requestor's 
reasons for wanting the information. 
The only time requestors may receIve slightly different access to records is when 
requestors request information regarding themselves. Under I.C. § 9-342(1), a person may 
inspect records regarding himself. This right, however, is limited by I.C. § 9-342(3)(a) which 
does not allow individuals to review "[o]therwise exempt investigatory records of a public 
agency or independent public body corporate and politic if the investigation is ongoing." I.C. § 
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9-342(3)(a). Furthermore, in the Gibson decision, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that I.C. § 9-
335 controls over I.e. § 9-342(1). 138 Idaho at 790. 
Under the PRA, the County cannot treat Mr. Wade any differently than any other 
requestor. Under both I.C. § 9-342(1) and the Gibson decision, Mr. Wade is not entitled to these 
records even though the records pertain to himself. Mr. Wade stands in the position of any 
requestor, and is treated no differently. Therefore, Mr. Wade was not entitled to those records. 
The validity of his reasons for wanting the investigatory records cannot factor into the County's 
decision to grant or refuse disclosure of the investigatory records - I.C. § 9-338 precludes the 
County from considering his reasons. Even though Mr. Wade's reasons appeared dire "enough" 
for the District Court, the PRA does not allow for differential treatment of Mr. Wade. 10 
Therefore, under the PRA, disclosing the investigatory records to Mr. Wade specifically but to 
no other parties is fundamentally flawed and reflects a misunderstanding of public records law. 
The District Court's June 5, 2012 Memorandum and Decision makes clear that the 
District Court applied a subjective standard when it ordered the disclosure of the records 
requested by Mr. Wade. The District Court spent considerable time analyzing Idaho tort law (an 
irrelevant and incorrect factor to consider when making public records decisions) and Mr. 
Wade's interest in obtaining the record (another irrelevant and incorrect factor), and then 
reasoned as follows: 
Under the facts known to the Petitioner at this time, he can effectively submit a 
tort claim; however, his ability to pursue this claim will be hindered unless given 
access to the requested documents. 
10 In its order, the District Court limited disclosure to Mr. Wade and his legal counsel only. See R. p. 102. 
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(R. p. 51). It is clear from a review of the decision that the District Court engaged in a balancing 
test of the County's interest in excluding the documents under I.C. § 9-335, and Mr. Wade's 
interests in filing a tort claim under I.e. § 6-907. 
The PRA does not allow for such a balancing test. As stated supra, the County is 
required by the act to objectively review the request and not go beyond the most basic 
information provided in the petition to determine whether disclosure is proper. The District 
Court's decision to weigh Mr. Wade's individual need and then find that the County improperly 
denied Mr. Wade's request is not supported by the law and is unfair to an agency making an 
objective determination under I.C. § 9-338. 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES 
The statute at I.C. § 9-344(2) allows an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party if 
"the request or refusal to provide records was frivolously pursued." I I (Emphasis added.). No 
other statute regarding attorney fees applies to this public records case. In Henry v. Taylor, a 
case litigated over a public records request, the Court reasoned as follows: 
Idaho Code section 9-344(2) sets forth the standard for awarding reasonable costs 
and attorney fees in actions pursuant to the Public Records Act. To base an award 
on some other statute would be contrary to the legislature's intent in including in 
the Act an attorney fee provision with a specified standard for awarding attorney 
fees in proceedings to enforce compliance with the Act. That statute is the 
exclusive basis for such an award. Therefore, Idaho Code sections 12-117 and 
12-121 do not apply. 
Henry v. Taylor, 152 Idaho 155, 162 (2012). 
Examining the Court's decisions in the context of attorney fees in public records 
litigation suggests that, at minimum, proving that a refusal to provide records was "frivolously 
pursued" requires the satisfaction of four requirements. First, the public agency must possess or 
II According to Black's Law Dictionary, "frivolous" means "Lacking a legal basis or legal merit, not serious; not 
reasonably purposeful." FRIVOLOUS, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). 
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have access to the writing. See I.C. § 9-337(3); Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State 
Dept. of Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 369-370 (2006). Second, the writing must be a public record. 
See I.C. § 9-337(13), (16). Third, the public record cannot be subject to any statutory exemption. 
See I.C. § 9-338(1); Idaho Conservation, 143 Idaho at 371 (" ... these Nutrition Management 
Plans qualify as public records for which there is no statutory exemption."); Henry, 152 Idaho at 
161 ("There is no contention that any of the records requested were exempt from disclosure ... "). 
Fourth, the public agency must deny the request for the public record. See Idaho Conservation, 
143 Idaho at 367; Henry, 152 Idaho at 157-158. 
The necessity of all four of these requirements to prove frivolous pursuit is apparent in 
Idaho case law. In Idaho Conservation, the Idaho State Department of Agriculture (hereinafter 
"ISDA") received a public records request from the Idaho Conservation League (hereinafter 
"ICL") for the Nutrition Management Plans (hereinafter "NMPs") of four specific feedlots. Two 
of those NMPs were specifically exempt from disclosure under I.C. § 22-2718( 4)(f). The other 
two NMPs were not exempt under any statute. Furthermore, the newly passed statute I.C. § 22-
4906 did not require the ISDA to retain copies of NMPs, but gave ISDA the statutory right to 
request NMPs from feedlots. 143 Idaho at 367. ISDA denied ICL's public records request for 
all four NMPs. The Court ruled in ICL's favor regarding ISDA's refusal to disclose the two 
NMPs that were not exempt from disclosure by statute. Id. at 369-370. ISDA satisfied the first 
requirement because it had a statutory right to demand access to the NMPs from private feedlots. 
Both parties agreed that the NMPs were public records, thus satisfying the second requirement. 
No statutory exemption applied (third requirement), and ISDA denied the request anyway (fourth 
requirement). Accordingly, the Court granted attorney fees to ICL. See id. at 370. 
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The necessity of these four requirements to show frivolous pursuit is again apparent in 
the Henry case. In refusing to award attorney fees, the Henry Court determined that the newly 
appointed prosecuting attorney did not frivolously fail to produce the former prosecuting 
attorney's bank statements at issue. 152 Idaho at 163. Although requirement three (the writing 
was not subject to any statutory exemption) and requirement four (the prosecuting attorney 
denied the request) were satisfied, the Henry Court questioned the satisfaction of requirement 
one (whether the new prosecuting attorney possessed or had access to the previous prosecuting 
attorney's bank statements), and requirement two (whether the writing was a public record). Id. 
at 162-163. 
The statute which controls the attorney fees issue in Mr. Wade's case is I.C. § 9-344(2). 
The Henry decision made apparent that the only applicable attorney fees statute in this context is 
the PRA statute, and thus Mr. Wade's request for attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 is mistaken. 
Just as in the Henry case, the dispute here is over a public records disclosure decision. The PRA 
provides its own specific attorney fees statute which governs awards of attorney fees for disputes 
regarding these matters. Therefore, the question is whether the County frivolously pursued the 
appeal. 
The County did not frivolously pursue this appeal. According to the "frivolously 
pursued" requirements set forth above, the County did satisfy the first requirement (the County 
possessed or had access to the documents), the second requirement (the documents were public 
records), and the fourth requirement (the County denied the public records request). The third 
requirement - the lack of any applicable statutory exemption from disclosure - however, remains 
to be satisfied. This case is therefore closely analogous to the Idaho Conservation case, but this 
time, the County relied on a statutory exemption - I.C. § 9-335 - which applies to investigatory 
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records. In the Idaho Conservation case, the lack of a statutory exemption for the records was 
not in question - ISDA was merely contesting that it was no longer a "custodian" of the 
documents. In contrast, the County is pointing to a statutory exemption in I.C. § 9-335, and is 
seeking clarification. Because the Court has not directly addressed whether investigatory records 
under prosecutorial review are exempt from disclosure, this case is one of first impression in 
Idaho. The County relied in good faith in I.C. § 9-335, the holdings in Bolger and Gibson, and 
thus did not act frivolously in denying Mr. Wade's public records request. For these reasons, 
Mr. Wade's request for attorney fees must be denied. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The County therefore respectfully asks this Court to reverse the District Court's decision, 
clarify the PRA statutes and case law, provide direction for law enforcement agencies 
(specifically, prosecuting attorneys) handling public records requests, and deny Mr. Wade's 
request for attorney fees. 
DATED: February 21,2013. 
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